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Abstract: Ng (2016) lists some modest examples of goals that animal advocates could work 
towards. We provide examples of more ambitious animal advocacy strategies that are successful 
now, and strategies that researchers can use to engage productively with animal advocates. We 
also agree with Ng and some other commentators that animal advocates and researchers should 
prioritize the interests of individual wild animals over the preservation of nonsentient entities. 
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Ng (2016) makes an important contribution in noting that science should concern itself with 
maximizing the well-being of nonhuman animals. While the equivalent concern for humans is 
the focus of multiple disciplines (medicine, development economics, etc.), nonhuman animals 
are more often viewed as a means to an end, whether it be the general advancement of 
knowledge, human concerns, or the preservation of ecosystems. However, as Ng notes, the 
neuroanatomical and behavioral evidence supports the common sense perception that a large 
variety of nonhuman animals — at least all vertebrates — are capable of feeling, so minimizing 
their suffering and maximizing their flourishing is an important goal from a variety of moral 
perspectives. 
 
We can consider bigger outcomes in animal advocacy. Some of the other commentators 
complain that Ng’s goals were too modest. Several offer criticism specifically of the “welfarist” 
approach; Marks (2016), for example, asks, “Need animal advocacy be considered a zero sum 
proposition that requires our commitment to only one or the other of animal welfare versus 
animal liberation?” He apparently concludes that this is in fact the case, making the remainder 
of his commentary an argument against welfarism. From our perspective as activists and 
researchers, this distinction makes little, if any, difference in animal advocacy strategy. 





For example, we believe that all the common philosophical positions lead to agreement with 
other commentaries (and Ng himself) that Ng’s suggested ways to help animals in low-cost, 
tractable ways are too modest and “just a starting position”— we can, and should, be willing to 
work towards larger outcomes — as shown by recent successes of animal advocacy groups. For 
example, advocates in India spearheaded a four-year ban on sports involving bulls; although the 
ban has ended, its enactment suggests that focusing solely on prohibiting the cruelest features 
of animal entertainment is an unnecessary restriction on the scope of advocates’ activities and 
demands (Muruganandham, 2016). 
 
Similarly, advocates for farmed animals should consider outcomes beyond increased cage sizes 
and increased awareness of the health benefits of eating less meat. Indeed, advocacy groups 
have had success in diverse methods of challenging the animal agriculture system, including 
increasing cage sizes or removing cages altogether, challenging the use of animals whose quality 
of life is necessarily low due to genetic factors (as Leadbeater (2016) mentions), increasing the 
availability and prominence of plant-based alternatives, and educating the public about the 
dangers to animals, humans, and the environment inherent in the continuation of the current 
food system (Barclay, 2015; Marshall & Green, 2015; Mohan, 2016; Neilson, 2016). 
 
Our research at Animal Charity Evaluators suggests that projects addressing these outcomes can 
be extremely cost-effective. In addition to direct outcomes, such as reducing the number of 
animals suffering in animal agriculture and eliminating some of the cruellest practices, we think 
interventions like corporate outreach and undercover investigations can facilitate big-picture 
achievements such as the eventual abolition of animal agriculture, largely by building the animal 
advocacy movement itself and setting animal-friendly precedents in policy and social norms.  
 
Recognizing wild animals as individuals. We agree with Ng’s suggestion that “without ignoring 
wild animals altogether, our initial emphasis should be more on farmed animals.” We appreciate 
that Johannsen (2016) takes this view further, suggesting that “animal rights theorists should 
acknowledge that their position also requires a hypothetical commitment to intervening in the 
wild.”  
 
We see animal suffering — especially the most intense forms like confinement, violent death, or 
serious illness — as morally horrific, regardless of its cause. This view comes naturally once one 
takes the perspective of the wild animal, who indicates in every part of his behavior that he 
strongly opposes his natural suffering. This recognition of animals as morally relevant persons 
with their own interests also leads to our opposition to human-caused suffering, and it’s the key 
reason we take a view different from that of Marks who sees wild animal welfare and 
preferences as “beside the point.” 
 
Academia can help animals in a number of ways. Ng offers suggestions as to how animal 
welfare advocates can be more effective, focusing primarily on two points which are compelling 
from an academic perspective: avoiding hyperbole and promoting technological progress that 
would enable us to be more effective in promoting both human and animal welfare. While these 




are good suggestions, on their own they reinforce a limiting view of the interaction between 
academics and advocates, one in which academics are restricted to advising advocates on the 
intellectual rigor of their approach, while advocates may be informed by academia but cannot 
offer reciprocal guidance that would help lead to the production of knowledge which could be 
applied to current problems. We feel it is important to recognize the full potential value of 
academic research for animal advocates and want to offer some possible strategies for 
academics:  
 
Most directly, scholars with expertise or interest in social sciences can provide empirical 
evidence to inform tactical decisions. Scholars could enhance advocates’ effectiveness by 
empirically testing methods of outreach and social change, and by communicating their 
findings to a broad audience of animal advocates. Studies could also be carried out 
collaboratively, with scholars providing research expertise and advocacy groups providing 
resources that allow scholars to work with large sample sizes in the field. They can also 
synthesize social movement information, psychological theories, and other streams of 
evidence to provide strategic guidance. 
 
Welfare biologists can also help advocates work in the most effective ways, by identifying 
the incremental changes, such as larger cages or less harmful breeding, that would most 
benefit animals as we work towards more fundamental improvements. 
 
Legal scholars can work with groups like the Nonhuman Rights Project to enhance and 
further the case for appropriate moral consideration of animals in the current legal 
framework. 
 
Animal ethicists, other philosophers, and other academics can work to identify arguments or 
methods of persuasion that can help others in their field appreciate the moral worth of 
animals and give them proper consideration. 
 
We are very excited about further collaboration between advocates and academics. Animal 
Charity Evaluators will be hosting a research symposium at Princeton University in November 
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